Mass Emigration and Political Change: Evidence from Historical Swedish Elections by Strandberg, Aron
Mass Emigration and Political Change:
Evidence from Historical Swedish Elections
NEKN01: Master Essay I∗
Aron Strandberg
Department of Economics
Lund University
January, 2018
Abstract
Migrants do not only affect the societies in which they arrive. When people leave in
large numbers, their absence will also have indirect consequences for the societies from
which they left. Between 1860 and 1930, 1.4 million Swedes emigrated abroad, most of
them settling in the United States. In this essay I look at how this historic migration
episode, in which a quarter of the population left the country, affected the political
outcomes in Sweden.
I link emigration records, election data and population censuses for 2363 municipal-
ities observed over 8 general elections between 1911 to 1928. I show that municipalities
with more emigration saw larger relative gains for left-wing parties in subsequent elec-
tions.
Looking at migrant selection, I find evidence that municipalities with more emigra-
tion turned relatively more collectivistic, lending some support to the hypothesis that
part of the left-wing gain can be explained as a consequence of ideological selection of
emigrants.
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1 Introduction
The Age of Mass Migration was a historically unprecedented episode of long-distance mi-
gration. Between 1850 to 1920, around 55 million Europeans left their home countries for
the New World. Of these, 30 million went to the United States (Abramitzky 2015). Some
European countries saw a particularly dramatic outflow of people. Around 1.4 million people
Swedes, or a quarter of the population, emigrated between 1860 and 1930. The overwhelm-
ing majority headed to the United States, with a smaller fraction going to places such as
Canada, Australia and South America. On a per-capita basis, the Swedish emigration rate
was the third highest in Europe (Barton 1994).
The arrival of immigrants shapes the societies in which they settle, both economically
and culturally. Many locations in the United States today have an identity rooted in the
diasporas that arrived during the mass migration era, connecting them to places such as
Scandinavia, Italy and Ireland. However, this is not the only effect of their journey. When
people leave in large numbers, their absence will indirectly also have consequences for the
societies from which they came.
In this essay, I focus on such one aspect in particular: the effect of migration on the
election outcomes in the sending country. I construct a dataset linking emigration records,
election data and population censuses for 2,362 municipalities or municipality groups ob-
served over the 8 general elections taking place between 1911 to 1928, the final years of
the Swedish emigration period. By setting the 1911 election outcome as the initial bench-
mark, my regression analysis estimates whether the changes in left-right vote shares in the
subsequent elections can be linked to the cumulative emigration outflow preceding them. I
show that municipalities with a larger emigration rate saw larger relative gains for left-wing
parties.
After establishing this relationship, I take a closer look at the mechanisms that can
explain it. I look in particular at migrant selection, and investigate its role in bringing about
the observed political change. Based on a strategy from a study of individualism at the
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United States frontier and its translation into support for the Republican Party (Bazzi et al.
2017), I apply a name-based proxy for individualism and find that Swedish municipalities
with more emigration saw a relative fall in this measure. This lends tentative support to the
hypothesis that part of the electoral success of the Social Democrat-headed left in the early
20th century can be attributed to the ideological selection of emigrants.
The rest of the essay proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a historical background of
Swedish emigration and the political development of the era. It also provides a discussion of
the literature and sets up the theoretical framework. Section 3 describes the data sources, the
variable construction, and the matching process used to link the different sources together.
Section 4 describes the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes
the essay.
2 Background and theory
2.1 Emigration history
When explaining the causes that set the Swedish mass emigration in motion, the historical
literature usally frames it in terms of the different push factors that encouraged people to
leave, and the pull factors that attracted them to the United States.
The first large emigration wave took place in the 1868-1873 period after a series of bad
harvests had led to famine in Sweden. In addition to this, important underlying push factors
for the early waves was the religious intolerance at home, dissatisfaction with the rigid class
system, overpopulation, low wages, and the lack of new arable farmland (Clemensson 1996).
The major pull factor for the early waves of emigrants was the promise of cheap land at the
frontier in the upper Midwest, made available for settlers through Lincoln’s 1862 Homestead
Act (Barton 1994). The next emigration wave between 1879-1993 was similar to the first
one. As the time and cost of traversing the Atlantic Ocean fell rapidly with steamships
replacing sailing as the main mode of transportation, emigration became a viable option
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for an increasing amount of people. After the ball was set rolling by the initial pioneers,
the flow of emigrants became self-perpetuating as the stories of success in newspapers and
letters home from friends and families provided a significant pull from the United States and
encouraged more people to follow in their footsteps.
In the mid-1890s, the farmers were followed by waves of workers who moved to the
American cities that grew rapidly during the Second Industrial Revolution. For Swedes,
Chicago became a major destination. In 1900, the estimated Swedish population of Chicago
was 100,000, making it more numerous than Malmo¨ and Gothenburg, and second only to
Stockholm, in terms of its Swedish population size (Pehrson 2014).
Although emigrating to the United States brought benefit to the migrants themselves,
its scale raised concern at home about the implications for the future of Sweden. In the
contemporary public debate as well as in academia, views were split on whether it was
harmful or benign. At an economics conference in 1881, Knut Wicksell tells about one side
of economists describing the exodus as “an aberration and a national disease that must be
extinguished”1 (Wicksell 1882). Wicksell himself aligned with the other side of the debate.
He argued that the surge in emigration was a symptom of the rapid population growth and
found it most likely, although with some reservation, that it would eventually balance itself
out through the balancing of labor supply and demand.
When the large-scale emigration showed no sign of stopping at the turn of the century,
a government commission was created with the purpose of figuring out solutions on how
to stem the flow. When the results were first published in 1908, around 20 percent of all
Swedes lived in the United States. The commission rejected the calls for clamping down on
emigration with restrictive laws against it. It argued instead in favor of “bringing the best
sides of America to Sweden”, which generally meant further economic and social reform that
would remove the incentives to migrate (Sundba¨rg 1913, Barton 1994).
The era of mass migration was made possible by the United States policy of near-open
1My translation
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Figure 1: Annual emigration flow from Sweden during the age of mass migration. Source:
Befolkningsstatistik, SCB (Statistics Sweden)
borders that allowed most Europeans to freely move into the country and naturalize as
citizens2. The first major restriction was a literacy test for entry in 1917, followed by the
Immigration Act of 1921 that set quotas on the maximum number of people permitted to
immigrate annually (Abramitzky & Boustan 2017). With this change of American policy,
the Age of Mass Migration came to an end. However, Swedes were generally literate and the
quotas were calculated in proportion to the size of the groups already living in the country.
This allowed Swedish migration into the United States to continue, reaching a new peak in
the 1920s before finally waning towards the end of the decade. After 1930 the migration flow
in Sweden reversed, and it has nearly every year since been a country of net immigration
(Statistics Sweden n.d.).
2For other groups, the rules were not as permissive. In 1882 and 1908 respectively, Chinese and Japanese
immigration was been prohibited with targeted exclusion acts
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2.2 Political development
Simultaneous to the mass migration era, Sweden also underwent political reform, starting in
1866 with the introduction of a modern bicameral parliament with a directly elected lower
chamber. The income-restricted franchise was gradually expanded over the following decades
as incomes grew and a larger share of men qualified. After major constitutional reform, the
1911 election was the first one with a proportional voting system, mandated party affiliations
for candidates, and abolished income-related voting restrictions. Now, a majority of men
were given the right to vote.3 From the 1921 election, voting rights were finally expanded to
women, and thus a majority of the population (Esaiasson 1990).
During the same period, Sweden saw the rise of social democracy and the labor union
movement. After its founding in 1889, the Social Democratic party went on a path of steadily
increasing political influence, and would soon establish itself as Sweden’s key political actor.
It entered government for the first time in 1917 as the junior coalition partner. After heading
several governments and serving as the main opposition throughout the 1920s, it got a
definitive hold on power in 1932, beginning a period of uninterrupted Social Democratic
governments that would last for 44 years.
2.3 Literature and theoretical approach
In one early study of Swedish emigration, Hatton (1995) estimates the emigration rate as a
function of a number of macroeconomic variables. Hatton finds that important explanatory
factors are the relative wage ratio between home and the destination, the relative employment
rates, and the stock of previous emigrants.
The earliest micro-level studies on the period are done by Wegge (1998, 2002). Analysing
a sample of German emigrants in the 1850s, Wegge finds that the establishment of emigrant
networks was negatively correlated to the wealth of emigrants, suggesting that chain migra-
3The only major remaining qualification requirement for men—the completion of military service—was
abolished in 1922.
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tion networks served as an efficient substitute for self-financing, allowing poor but connected
individuals to emigrate. Looking at migrant selection, she finds that middle-skilled German
workers disproportionally emigrated to the United States compared to low- and high-skilled
ones, suggesting that the former did not have the means to go and the latter were aﬄuent
enough to not finding it worthwhile.
In more recent years, the digitalization of censuses and historical records has opened up
a new field research where individual and local decisions can be studied at a fine-grained
level that simply was not possible before. Most noteworthy in this field is the work by
Abramitzky, Boustan, and Erickson that has resulted in a series of papers covering different
aspects of the age of mass migration. Abramitzky et al. (2012) link Norwegians between
United States and Norwegian censuses and estimate the return to migration by comparing
Norwegian emigrants with their brothers who remained in Norway. They find that the return
to migration was relatively low compared to today’s standard, and that urban emigrants were
negatively selected from the skill distribution.
Considering its historical significance, the effect of the mass migration era on the sending
countries has received little attention in research (Abramitzky & Boustan 2017). My essay
is most closely related to Karadja & Prawitz (2016), which is the first to study the effects
of emigration on political outcomes in Sweden. After instrumenting emigration with the
series of frost shocks that triggered the initial emigration wave, they go on to show that
instrumented emigration can explain a multitude of later political outcomes, including the
increasing share of left-wing votes, higher rates of labor organization, strike participation, and
voter turnout. Karadja and Prawitz consider the entire migration period before democracy
and its effect on the political outcome that followed, measured as the average left-wing share
in the elections between 1911 to 1921, and find a significant effect of the former on the latter.
To measure the relationship between the two trends, I choose a different approach,
wherein I use the first available election outcome in 1911 as the pre-treatment starting
point. From there, I look at how the emigration that followed affected voting, measured at
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the deviation from the initial 1911 level, while controlling for observable and unobservable
heterogeneity.
After establishing the link between emigration and left-wing electoral gains, there are
mainly two groups of explanations for the underlying mechanism that causes it, focusing on
whether the left-wing gain is the result of individual change or demographic change.
Representative of the first explanation is the hypothesis that the outside option of emi-
gration strengthened the bargaining power of the left-wing labor unions, vis-a-vis the elite.
With the reduced labor supply or the threat of further emigration making the elite more
susceptible to labor demands, this would then translate into stronger popular support for
the Social Democratic Party (and other left-wing parties) which was closely connected to
the labor union movement.
The alternative hypothesis is that emigrants disproportionally consisted of people that
were more likely to vote for non left-wing parties. It is possible that these people were more
attracted by American pull factors such as the promise of individual liberty or the higher
return to entrepreneurialism. When these people left Sweden for the United States, the
proportion of voter groups would then shift in favor of the left.
Karadja & Prawitz believe that the first explanation is the most likely, and that emigrants
were not substantially different from the rest of the population on relevant characteristics.
In the second part of my analysis, I give the alternative theory a new chance. For this part, I
draw inspiration from Bazzi et al. (2017), who study the impact of the United States frontier
experience on the political and social outcomes of the counties that historically was a part
of it. Based on social psychology findings, the authors start by noting that individualistic-
minded people are more prone to give their children infrequent names, whereas collectivists
more often pick frequent names, reflecting their respective desire to stand out or fit in. This
attitude is transmitted intergenerationally as it is reflected in the upbringing and family
identity.
Using the frequencies of different names as a proxy for individualism in society, the
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measurement has been shown to be strongly correlated with other proxies such as the relative
use of collective pronouns (we, us) versus singular ones (I, me), and the well-used Hofstede
index. Individualism in this context, as contrasted to collectivism, should be thought of as
traits related to individual independence, self-reliance and self-interest.
Making use of this relationship, Bazzi et al. analyze the people settling at the United
States frontier in the 19th century. The authors show that migrant selection disproportion-
ally drew individualists to the frontier. The time length of a region’s frontier exposure in
the past translates to individualism that persists even to this day. Counties with longer
frontier experience are more strongly Republican, more individualist, and more opposed to
redistribution and regulation. It is easy to see how such an attraction would have the inverse
consequences for places with a high sending rate. In the sense that the United States itself
constituted a “frontier” for Swedes with the characteristics described above, what we would
observe in municipalities with large emigration is a shift away from individualism. After
establishing the relationship between emigration and voting, this is what I investigate in the
second part of the analysis.
3 Data
The data used in the empirical analysis comes from a variety of sources. This section
describes the data sources, the matching process that combines them together, and the
transformations used to bring forth the final variables used in the analysis.
3.1 Election data
Historical Swedish election data has been digitized by Berglund (1988) and is provided
for research through the Swedish National Data Service. The election data is available at
the municipality level and consists of the number eligible voters and votes for each party
in the general elections to the lower chamber of the Swedish Riksdag. Although Riksdag
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elections have been taking place since 1866, the 1911 election was the first one in Sweden with
proportional voting, mandatory party affiliation for candidates, and a generally franchised
male population. This makes it the first election with results that can be directly comparable
to subsequent ones, and the natural starting point for analysis.
Eight elections took place between 1911 and 1928, consisting of both regularly scheduled
ones and snap elections4. Of the 2,576 different municipalities in the election data, not every
municipality existed every year, as many were the results of splits and mergers that took place
throughout the period. To create time-consistent units of observation, I use a codebook by
O¨hngren (1977) that document all such administrative changes, and merge all municipalities
with any shared border changes until I have groups of municipalities whose outer borders are
unchanged throughout the entire period. I also merge neighboring municipalities that have
identical names except from a separating suffix (such as city and rural) to avoid ambiguity
when matching emigrants to municipalities. 7 percent of municipalities are merged as a
consequence and the result is 2,362 municipality groupings which constitute the units of
observation in the empirical analysis. For brevity, I refer to these as just municipalities in
the rest of this essay.
The dependent variable LeftDiff. is calculated by first dividing the number of votes for
left-wing parties by the total number of valid votes in each election, and then subtracting
the initial 1911 result. The initial outcome is added separately as a control variable. I
define left-wing parties as the large Social Democratic Party plus the smaller socialist and
communist parties (whom varied in name and number between elections). The voter turnout
is calculated by dividing the number of eligible voters with the total number of votes.
3.2 Emigration data
The Emiganten Popula¨r dataset (Clemensson 2006) consists of the passenger list records of
1.4 million people embarking to North America from Swedish ports during the mass migra-
4Election years: 1911, 1914 (#1), 1914 (#2), 1917, 1920, 1921, 1924, 1928. All elections took place in
September except the first 1914 election which took place in March.
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tion era, including Swedes who traveled over Copenhagen and Hamburg. When emigrants
were about to embark, they were registered by the police. These emigration lists were then
confirmed by the passenger lines at departure. Each person provided a range of personal
information, as well as their departure date, destination, home county, and place of ori-
gin (most often their parish). I make use the latter two to match as many individuals as
possible to each of the 2,363 municipalities in the election dataset. This is done with an it-
erative matching process. First starting with matching the two records on county and exact
municipality name5, the latter is gradually made more permissive by allowing misspellings,
abbreviations, and other variations. Although many locations across Sweden share similar
names, by constraining the search to within the provided county, most matches can be made
without ambiguity.
In total, I am able to match 832,102 individuals to their home municipalities. This
constitutes 94 percent of those that have provided a location string and a valid county, and
77 percent of those that are likely to be from Sweden (Those remaining after subtracting
other nationalities and non-residents; mainly Swedes already living in America). By visual
inspection of individuals that can not be matched, the most common reason for non-matching
is that many have simply provided “no location”, or something too unspecific such as their
county name, or just “Sweden”. Some undercounting of emigrants is therefore unavoidable.
Apart from outbound passenger lists, an alternative source of individual emigration statis-
tics is the records created by the parish churches as people emigrated. Karadja & Prawitz
(2016) reviews both sources and show that the numbers on average are corresponding when
controlling for gaps in the latter dataset. The independence of the two sources indicates
that the records have a good degree of reliability. Even still, when summing up the matched
tally of each county and comparing them with the aggregate numbers from the statistical
yearbooks, it is clear that some counties are more affected than others by emigrant under-
5In this period, non-urban municipalities and parishes were largely corresponding in name and area,
making the matching straight-forward. A complimentary list of parish names is added from Andrae (1998).
The municipality keys to remaining (city) parishes are inputted manually.
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counting6. In the main presented results, county fixed effects are included to take this into
account. As a part of ensuring robustness of the results, I also rerun all the regressions
with counties sequentially omitted to make sure those with implied undercounting are not
significantly biasing the results.
The main independent variable, Log Cumulative Emigration, is defined as the log cumu-
lative emigration from the 1911 election up to the time of the observation. Past emigration
highly predicts future emigration. To take this into account, a control variable is included
that sums up the total emigration from 1870 up to the 1911 election. In the second analy-
sis, concerning individualism, I measure all the emigration variables and available controls
according to the same principles as above, but instead starting in 1880 and accumulating up
to the three years of observation, the last of which is 1910. To deal with the log transfor-
mation problem in observations without any observed emigration, I study the outcome both
when omitting them and when adding one extra emigrated person per municipality. As the
estimates remain in line with either method, I use the latter in the presented results.
3.3 Other data
The North Atlantic Population Project (Minnesota Population Center 2017) maintains a
database with four decennial Swedish censuses between 1880 and 1910. Each census is full-
count and contains about 5 million individuals, the total population at the time. I summarize
them to calculate the mean age, sex ratio, urbanization, and total population of each mu-
nicipality. Almost all parishes can be immediately name-matched to their corresponding
municipalities in the election dataset. I link the remaining few manually.
The main measures used in the individualism analysis come from this census data. Within
each decadal cohort and gender, I calculate whether each person has a frequent name ac-
cording to different thresholds such as top 5 and top 20, taking differences in spelling into
account. Bazzi et al. (2017) use even larger thresholds for American names, up to top 100.
6See Appendix table 5.
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In Sweden, the name variation was much smaller. In the average municipality in 1880, 74
percent of people had one of the 20 most common first names of their gender and cohort.
In one municipality, 91 percent of people had first names ranked in the top 20. I explore
some alternative measures, ranking names within regions and counties instead of country-
wide popularity. Due to their large similarity, I decide that the country-wide measurement
will suffice as a proxy for individualism. Each municipality has the share of frequent names
observed in four years: 1880, 1890, 1900 and 1910. For the latter three years, the change in
this variable compared to 1880 is then calculated.
Gothenburg and Malmo¨ were the main ports of embarkation. From there, people were
first usually escorted to Liverpool, where they boarded an ocean liner that took them to
the United States. Of the people emigrating from Sweden during the mass migration era,
83 percent departed from Gothenburg and 13 percent departed from Malmo¨. The remain-
ing fraction departed from a number of smaller ports, such as Stockholm, Norrko¨ping and
Kalmar (Clemensson 2006; my calculations). Following Karadja & Prawitz (2016), I use the
distance from municipalities to ports of embarkation as a proxy for remoteness. Historical
administrative shapefiles are provided by Swedish National Archives (2016). Using these, I
calculate the centroid of each municipality and from them the straight line distance to either
Gothenburg or Malmo¨, whichever is closest. One extra kilometer is added to avoid the log
transformation problem for the two cities themselves.
Summary statistics of the calculated data are presented in table 1 and 2. Table 1 summa-
rizes the data that is used in the analysis of emigration and election outcomes. The following
table 2 summarizes the data that is used in the analysis of emigration and individualism.
4 Empirical specification
The goal of the first analysis is to estimate whether changes in the election outcome can be
explained by the number of emigrants that left in the period preceding the election. To do
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Table 1: Election Analysis - Summary Statistics
Mean Std.Dev. Obs Min Max
Year 1919.71 4.80 16534 1914.00 1928.00
Left Diff. 0.11 0.15 16396 -0.70 0.86
Left Share 0.28 0.21 16499 0.00 0.94
1911 Left Share 0.16 0.20 16422 0.00 0.90
1910 Urban Share 0.03 0.17 16534 0.00 1.00
1910 Mean Age 30.78 2.39 16534 22.27 39.59
1910 Male Share 0.50 0.02 16534 0.41 0.60
1910 Population 2369.76 10007.08 16534 122.00 404605.00
1911 Voter Turnout 0.58 0.13 16513 0.04 0.90
1910 Union Share 0.00 0.02 16534 0.00 0.31
County 12.09 5.87 16534 1.00 25.00
1910 Top 10 Name Share 0.52 0.08 16534 0.28 0.72
1910 Top 20 Name Share 0.68 0.06 16534 0.44 0.84
Cumul. Emigration 25.94 106.23 16534 1.00 8617.00
Port Distance 223.69 191.30 16534 1.00 1236.68
1870-1911 Emigration 278.04 647.43 16534 1.00 20365.00
1890-1911 Emigration 147.06 392.95 16534 1.00 13097.00
Table 2: Name Analysis - Summary Statistics
Mean Std.Dev. Obs Min Max
Year 1900.02 8.17 7058 1890.00 1910.00
1880 Top 3 Name Share 0.33 0.09 6984 0.08 0.59
Top 3 Diff -0.02 0.03 6975 -0.22 0.11
1880 Top 5 Name Share 0.42 0.08 6984 0.18 0.67
Top 5 Diff -0.03 0.03 6975 -0.23 0.10
1880 Top 10 Name Share 0.58 0.10 6984 0.30 0.79
Top 10 Diff -0.04 0.04 6975 -0.30 0.12
1880 Top 20 Name Share 0.74 0.08 6984 0.46 0.91
Top 20 Diff -0.04 0.04 6975 -0.37 0.12
1880 Share Male 0.49 0.02 6984 0.41 0.58
1880 Mean Age 28.57 1.64 6984 22.83 35.44
Port Distance 222.67 191.29 7058 0.00 1235.68
County 12.08 5.87 7058 1.00 25.00
Cumul. Emigration 182.57 453.89 7058 0.00 19787.00
1880 Population 1932.66 4206.86 6984 52.00 153090.00
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this, I use the following specification:
LeftDiffmct = βEmigrationmct + φc + γt + X
′
mβX + εmct (1)
The outcome variable LeftDiffmct is the change of the share of votes for left wing parties in
municipality m of county c at election t, as compared to the 1911 election. In other words,
this variable measures a municipality’s relative political change, compared to its starting
point.
The main independent variable Emigrationmct is the log cumulative number of emigrants
since the 1911 election up until election t. Its estimated coefficient, β, gives us the level-log
estimate of how accumulated emigration affects the vote outcome.
φc is a fixed effect for each of the 25 counties and γt a fixed effect for each of the 7
observed elections. X′m is a vector of municipality controls, all of which are fixed at their
initial values in 1910 or 1911. The inclusion of the log 1910 population in X′m scales the
level of emigrants to the initial size of the municipality. εmct is the error term.
The main threat to a causal interpretation of the result is the existence of omitted vari-
ables that biases the estimates. Although the risk of omitted variable bias can never be
completely eliminated, a number of steps can be made to mitigate their potential influence,
allowing for a more causal interpretation of the result. After establishing a significant rela-
tionship between emigration and the outcome, I progressively expand the regressions with a
larger set of control variables to take into account the initial conditions of each municipality.
To minimize the risk of unobserved spatial and temporal heterogeneity biasing the results,
all regressions include both county fixed effects and election fixed effects. The inclusion of
fixed effects estimators is standard practice in economic analysis and greatly reduce the risk
of influential omissions, although at the expense of losing potentially useful signal.
In the second analysis, concerning changes in individualism, I uses a very similar spec-
ification to the first one. Instead of 1911-1928, the observed period is now 1880-1910, cor-
responding to the available census data. The year 1880 is used as the initial (and omitted)
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year that the other variables are calculated relative to. To measure the effect of emigration
on individualism, I use the following specification:
TopNameDiffmct = βEmigrationmct + φc + γt + X
′
mβX + εmct (2)
The outcome variable TopNameDiffmct is the change of the share of people in municipality
m at year t with a frequent name compared to 1880. As a proxy variable, it therefore
measures how a municipality gets less or more individualistic, relative to its starting position.
As mentioned earlier, the popularity of each name is measured within each decadal cohort
and gender. I vary the threshold of what constitutes a common name when running the
regressions. In the results, I present regressions setting it at top 20, top 10, and top 5.
Just as in equation 1, φc is a fixed effect for each of the 25 counties. Here, γt a fixed
effect for each of the three observed years.
The only other differences of this specification compared to (1) is that Emigrationmct
accumulates from 1880 up to the observed year, and that the covariates included in X′m
are fixed at their 1880 levels. The vector of controls also includes the initial proportion of
frequent names for each threshold.
The main coefficient of interest, β, is then an estimation of how the accumulated emi-
gration affects the proportion of names in the municipality.
5 Results
5.1 Emigration and voting
Five different estimates of equation 1 are presented in table 3 below. From left to right,
it starts with a baseline estimation in column (1) and is progressively expanded until it
includes the maximum number of covariates in column (5). All regressions include county
fixed effects, election fixed effects, and use robust standard errors.
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In all columns, the relationship between emigration and the vote outcome is in level-
log form. The interpretation of such a relationship is that a 1 percent change in cumulative
emigration results is associated with an estimated β percentage point change in the outcome.
The baseline column (1) is included as a comparison benchmark. By not controlling
for the initial election outcome and past emigration—two vital factors—it is clear that it
does not produce well-fitting results. In all columns (2)-(5) we see a small but significant
positive effect of emigration on the left-wing vote share outcome. To take an example, the
point estimate in column (2) of a ten percent increase in emigration is a predicted 0.054
percentage point increase in the left-wing vote share 7. A doubling of emigration in the same
estimation associated with 0.394 percentage point shift in favor of the left.
As a larger set of covariates are introduced, the emigration point estimates and their
significance levels falls somewhat as expected, but remain in line with the previous columns.
Initial population size is positively associated with left-wing gains. Both the initial left-wing
share and earlier emigration are both strongly associated with a decline in the left-wing
vote. This should likely be interpreted as a consequence of regression toward the mean. If
the left-wing vote share was very high to begin with, there will be more room for decline
than for any further growth. Initial emigration is negatively associated with the outcome,
possibly for the same reason. If a large past emigration led to a high initial left-wing share,
the difference could then tend toward the mean as a result.
There is a positive relationship between left-wing voting and the initial share of men, the
distance to the nearest port, and initial union membership per capita. Initial mean age is
negatively associated with the outcome. I find no predictive value in the initial urban share
variable, the voter turnout, or the initial share of people with a frequent first name.
7With the level-log model—used in all presented regressions—the effect of a 10 percent increase in emi-
gration is obtained by multiplying the estimated coefficient by ln(1.1)
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Table 3: Emigration vs. Election Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Left Diff. Left Diff. Left Diff. Left Diff. Left Diff.
Log Cumul. Emig. -0.00176 0.00569∗∗∗ 0.00344∗∗ 0.00354∗∗ 0.00321∗
(0.00121) (0.00139) (0.00133) (0.00133) (0.00133)
1910 Log Population 0.0195∗∗∗ 0.0388∗∗∗ 0.0251∗∗∗ 0.0250∗∗∗ 0.0238∗∗∗
(0.00189) (0.00179) (0.00181) (0.00186) (0.00187)
1911 Left Share -0.353∗∗∗ -0.443∗∗∗ -0.442∗∗∗ -0.448∗∗∗
(0.00635) (0.00701) (0.00718) (0.00735)
1870-1911 Log Emig. -0.00949∗∗∗ -0.00386∗∗ -0.00407∗∗∗ -0.00390∗∗
(0.00127) (0.00121) (0.00122) (0.00122)
1910 Male Share 0.230∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗
(0.0610) (0.0612) (0.0611)
1910 Urban Share 0.0106 0.0105 0.00512
(0.00679) (0.00681) (0.00686)
1910 Mean Age -0.0197∗∗∗ -0.0197∗∗∗ -0.0194∗∗∗
(0.000615) (0.000620) (0.000623)
1911 Voter Turnout 0.00190 -0.00225
(0.00900) (0.00902)
Log Port Dist. 0.0176∗∗∗ 0.0184∗∗∗
(0.00313) (0.00316)
1910 Union Share 0.379∗∗∗
(0.0662)
1910 Top 10 Name Share 0.00326
(0.0235)
Constant -0.329∗∗∗ -0.368∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗
(0.0240) (0.0218) (0.0447) (0.0501) (0.0506)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 16396 16156 16156 16156 16156
Adj. R-sq 0.208 0.347 0.402 0.404 0.405
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4: Emigration vs. Name Frequency Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Top 20 Diff. Top 20 Diff. Top 10 Diff. Top 5 Diff.
Log Cumul. Emig. 0.000915∗∗ 0.00136∗∗∗ 0.00123∗∗∗ 0.00103∗∗∗
(0.000341) (0.000327) (0.000317) (0.000281)
1880 Log Population -0.00115 -0.00156∗ -0.000272 0.000745
(0.000662) (0.000612) (0.000601) (0.000539)
1890 Dummy 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
1900 Dummy -0.0208∗∗∗ -0.0210∗∗∗ -0.0213∗∗∗ -0.0138∗∗∗
(0.000799) (0.000756) (0.000767) (0.000681)
1910 Dummy -0.0451∗∗∗ -0.0455∗∗∗ -0.0434∗∗∗ -0.0318∗∗∗
(0.000900) (0.000823) (0.000824) (0.000752)
1880 Top N Share -0.254∗∗∗ -0.258∗∗∗ -0.285∗∗∗
(0.00763) (0.00725) (0.00686)
Log Port Dist. 0.000257 0.000732 0.00339∗∗∗
(0.00126) (0.00116) (0.000942)
1880 Share Male 0.0297 0.0729∗∗ 0.0753∗∗∗
(0.0227) (0.0226) (0.0207)
1880 Mean Age 0.0000264 0.0000290 0.000214
(0.000238) (0.000238) (0.000209)
Constant 0.00315 0.158∗∗∗ 0.0770∗∗∗ 0.0140
(0.00768) (0.0182) (0.0170) (0.0154)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6975 6975 6975 6975
Adj. R-sq 0.394 0.499 0.571 0.455
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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5.2 Emigration and names
The results in table 4 shows the relationship between emigration and the change in popular
name shares. In the table, I present one baseline regression in column (1) and three regression
with full controls in columns (2)-(4), all with different thresholds in the dependent variable
to illustrate the variation. All regressions include county fixed effects, election fixed effects,
and use robust standard errors. Just like in the previous results, the relationship between
emigration and the outcome is in level-log form.
When emigration increases, the result is an increase in the share of remaining residents
with a frequent name. It should be noted, as made evident by the displayed dummy variables,
that the general trend over the years was toward more name variation. To the extent that
the relationship holds and more emigration results in less individualism, it is a relative one
compared to other municipalities. The point estimates of the emigration effect are very small,
ranging from 0.000915 to 0.00136. For example, according to the largest point estimate in
column (2), a quadrupling of emigration would result in a 0.189 percentage point shift toward
top 20 names in the municipality.
The initial name share has a strong negative impact on the dependent variable. This is
almost certainly due to the regression to the mean effect that I also observed in the equivalent
variables in table 3.
Generally, the significance of the effects increase as the threshold for the outcome variable
increases. Initial population size is only weakly associated with the outcome in one of the
regressions. I can find no effect of the initial mean age on the outcome. The remaining
covariates that control for the share of males and distance to ports are positive and significant
only with higher name frequency thresholds.
5.3 The missing link
Taken individually, the results of the regression analyses in table 3 and table 4 are in line
with the hypothesis I laid out based on the findings of Bazzi et al. (2017). Emigration is
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shown to both increase the left-wing vote share and the share of remaining people with a
frequent name, the latter interpreted as a relative shift toward less individualism.
Before any conclusions about the nature of emigrant selection can be drawn based on
these results, one missing link remains. This is to demonstrate that it is the decrease in
individualism, as proxied by name shares, that is shifting the election outcomes in favor
of the left. Swedish censuses after 1910 have not yet been made available for public use.
Therefore, it is not yet possible to perform a similar analysis where changes in names are
the treatment on election outcomes.
I perform a number of simple regressions of name frequency levels on later average election
outcomes to see whether a preliminary correlative relationship can be established between
the two 8. However, this does not produce any significant results in the relevant variables.
The relevance of the second result should therefore be viewed tentatively. For now, it is
mainly a suggestion of where to search for the mechanism that is causing the positive effect
of emigration on the left-wing vote share.
6 Concluding remarks
The aim of this essay has been to explore the impact of emigration on election outcomes, as
well as analyzing its underlying mechanism.
The main finding is that more emigration, as measured cumulatively, resulted in larger
vote shares for left-wing parties in the elections that followed. The point estimates are small,
with doubling or quadrupling of emigration levels only resulting in shifts that are fractions of
a percentage point. Although the estimated effects are strongly significant, they are unlikely
to have swayed any elections in the short timespans examined in this study, even considering
the large sending rates of the period.
Secondly, I find that in municipalities with more emigration, the share of people with a
frequent name increased. This could be related to migrant selection, and that more individ-
8See Appendix for examples
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ualistic people were more likely to emigrate. A remaining step to connect these two parts
of analysis is to directly establish the relationship between decreasing individualism through
emigration and increasing left-wing voting. Findings in previous research have connected
the two in United States, to where the overwhelming majority of Swedish emigrants went.
For now, I can only show that they are indirectly connected through emigration.
I have taken a series of steps to underpin the causal inference of the results, including
controlling for initial conditions and applying fixed effects estimators both temporally and at
the county level. Even still, the risk of unobserved confounding factors can not be completely
eliminated, meaning that the results should be taken with caution.
In recent years, there has been large increase in quantitative historical data being digitized
and made available for research. In databases such as the the North Atlantic Population
Project, more censuses are continuously being made available. Using distant historical data
for economic analysis comes with both advantages and disadvantages, as made evident in
this essay. Most interestingly, the historical setting allows us to study migration decisions
in institutional settings that are currently not existing—in this case, a world of near-open
borders.
The findings of my essay sheds some further light on the characteristics of Swedish em-
igration and its political consequences. The true nature of ideological selection and the
explaining mechanism between emigration and election outcomes remains a topic for future
research to discover.
22
References
Abramitzky, R. (2015), ‘Economics and the modern economic historian’, The Journal of
Economic History 75(4), 1240–1251.
Abramitzky, R. & Boustan, L. (2017), ‘Immigration in american economic history’, Journal
of Economic Literature 55(4), 1311–1345.
Abramitzky, R., Boustan, L. P. & Eriksson, K. (2012), ‘Europe’s tired, poor, huddled masses:
Self-selection and economic outcomes in the age of mass migration’, American Economic
Review 102(5), 1832–56.
URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.102.5.1832
Andrae, C G Lundqvist, S. (1998), ‘Folkro¨relsearkivet 1881-1950 (the social movement
archive)’, SND: Svensk Nationell Datatja¨nst .
Barton, H. (1994), A Folk Divided: Homeland Swedes and Swedish Americans, 1840-1940,
Studia multiethnica Upsaliensia, Southern Illinois University Press.
URL: https://books.google.se/books?id=9m1zOOpFTwwC
Bazzi, S., Fiszbein, M. & Gebresilasse, M. (2017), Frontier culture: The roots and persistence
of ”rugged individualism” in the united states, Working Paper 23997, National Bureau of
Economic Research.
URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w23997
Berglund, S. (1988), ‘Svenska valdata 1911–1944’, SND: Svensk Nationell Datatja¨nst .
Clemensson, P. (1996), ‘Go¨teborgska ka¨llor till den stora utvandringen’, Dokumentet 3.
Clemensson, P. (2006), ‘Go¨teborgsemigranten: Databasen emigranten popula¨r’.
Esaiasson, P. (1990), Svenska valkampanjer 1866-1988.
Hatton, T. J. (1995), ‘A model of scandinavian emigration, 1870–1913’, European Economic
Review 39(3), 557–564.
Karadja, M. & Prawitz, E. (2016), ‘Exit, voice, and political change: Evidence from swedish
mass migration to the united states’.
Minnesota Population Center (2017), North Atlantic Population Project: Complete Count
Microdata: Version 2.3 [dataset], University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN.
URL: https://doi.org/10.18128/D040.V2.3
O¨hngren, B. (1977), GEOKOD: en kodlista fo¨r den administrativa indelningen i Sverige
1862-1951, Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis.
Pehrson, L. (2014), Den nya staden: Utvandringen till Amerika II, Albert Bonniers Fo¨rlag.
URL: https://books.google.se/books?id=6cGKAwAAQBAJ
23
Statistics Sweden (n.d.), ‘Befolkningsstatistik’, https://www.scb.se/hitta-statistik/
sverige-i-siffror/manniskorna-i-sverige/in-och-utvandring/. Accessed: 2018-
01-09.
Sundba¨rg, G. (1913), ‘Emigrationsutredningen: Beta¨nkande’, Norstedt & So¨ner .
Swedish National Archives (2016), ‘Historical gis maps 1569-1998’, https://riksarkivet.
se/psidata. Accessed: 2018-01-08.
Wegge, S. A. (1998), ‘Chain migration and information networks: Evidence from nineteenth-
century hesse-cassel’, The Journal of Economic History 58(4), 957–986.
Wegge, S. A. (2002), ‘Occupational self-selection of european emigrants: Evidence from
nineteenth-century hesse-cassel’, European Review of Economic History 6(3), 365–394.
Wicksell, K. (1882), Om utvandringen, dess betydelse och orsaker. Fo¨redrag, etc, Albert
Bonniers Fo¨rlag.
24
Appendix
l
l
l
ll
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
ll
l lll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
−0.5
0.0
0.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Election
L
ef
t 
D
if
f.
 (
Si
nc
e 
19
11
)
Figure 2: Left Diff. distribution by election
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Figure 3: Top 10 Name Share Diff. distribution by year
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Table 5: Average left-wing share 1911-1921
(1) (2) (3)
Av. Left Share Av. Left Share Av. Left Share
1910 Log Populatio n 0.0353∗∗∗ 0.0354∗∗∗ 0.0355∗∗∗
(0.00671) (0.00675) (0.00677)
1870-1911 Log Emig. -0.0186 -0.0185 -0.0189
(0.0184) (0.0185) (0.0186)
1910 Top 3 Name Share -0.104
(0.139)
1910 Share Urban -0.0213 -0.0221 -0.0237
(0.0147) (0.0149) (0.0149)
1910 Mean Age -0.0300∗∗∗ -0.0300∗∗∗ -0.0298∗∗∗
(0.00314) (0.00313) (0.00309)
Log Port Dist. 0.00974 0.0102 0.00986
(0.0167) (0.0168) (0.0168)
1910 Share Male 0.320 0.321 0.322
(0.177) (0.176) (0.174)
1910 Voter Turnout 0.135∗ 0.136∗ 0.136∗
(0.0532) (0.0531) (0.0533)
1910 Union Share 1.365∗∗ 1.364∗∗ 1.370∗∗
(0.418) (0.418) (0.417)
1910 Top 5 Name Share -0.0934
(0.138)
1910 Top 10 Name Share -0.131
(0.140)
Constant 0.623∗∗ 0.622∗∗ 0.650∗∗
(0.203) (0.202) (0.209)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2325 2325 2325
Adj. R-sq 0.606 0.606 0.607
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure 4: The correlation between emigration before and after the 1911 election. Source:
Clemensson 2006; my calculations)
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Figure 5: The number of matched emigrants per county-year (solid blue) vs. the total
number according to aggregated SCB statistics.
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